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Abstract 
In this paper we consider a market where a heterogeneous population 
of individual actors demands units of various types of a heterogeneous 
good (e.g., housing) and also have the possibility to withdraw from 
the market. It is assumed that allocation on the market does not 
(completely)take place by means of the price mechanism, either because 
prices are completely fixed, or because they can only vary within some 
limited range. Rationing is assumed takes place by preventing some 
actors to realize the alternative they have chosen. 
We will proof three existence theorems. First of all we demonstrate 
the existence of a rationed equilibrium when all prices are completely 
fixed. Second, we show the existence of a mixed equilibrium, i.e., an 
equilibrium where demand and supply are matched partly by means of 
price adjustments and partly by means of quantity rationing. Third, we 
proof the existence of a mixed equilibrium in a situation where the 
rationing is allowed to vary over the different classes of demanders 
and over their present situation. This introduces the possibility to 
give a preferential treatment to some groups of demanders. The second 
theorem is a generalisation of the first ; the third a generalisation 
of the second. 

1 
1 Introduction. 
In recent years there has been a lot of interest in the existence 
and uniqueness of price-equilibria in markets where aggregate demand 
is determined on the basis of discrete choice models for individual 
decision-makers (cf. Anas[1982], Anas and Cho[1986], Eriksson[1986], 
Smith[1988], Rouwendal[1988b]). Although the results derived in these 
papers are of a more general nature, in some of these articles 
application of them to the housing market seems to have been a major 
motivation for studying such price equilibria. It is well-known, 
however, that in many countries the housing market is not a 'free' 
market where prices can have any value required to equilibrate demand 
and supply. Many governments have taken measures to regulate the 
market and limit price flexibility. It would therefore be of interest 
to study the possibilities of regulating the market by means of some 
rationing mechanism. In the present paper some steps in this direction 
will be made by considering a particular form of rationing in 
situations where prices are either completely fixed or can vary within 
some exogenously determined limits only. 
2 Preliminaries 
We consider a population consisting of b actors. Each actor belongs 
to one of M possible classes. This population is distributed over N+l 
possible states, indexed 0,1,...,N. State 0 should be identified with 
non-participation. 
In each period every.actor is confronted with N+l alternatives, N of 
which should be identified with types of the good traded in the 
market, from which he can choose one, while the remaining one refers 
to non-participation. When there is rationing he cannot be sure 
whether the alternative chosen can be realized by him. If realization 
is not possible it is assumed that such an actor will continue his 
present state. For the housing market this implies that households 
that desire to move to another type of dweiling, will not always be 
able to realize this desire and will then continue living in their 
present dweiling. It is assumed that the latter possibility is always 
existent . 
The various choice alternatives are identified by a vector x of 
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characteristics. The price associated with each of the alternatives is 
one of them. The characteristics associated with the various 
alternatives influence the Utilities that will be attached to them by 
the actors and are for this reason an important determinant of choice-
behaviour. 
When choice for a particular alternative would imply the realization 
of that alternative with certainty, the characteristics x would be 
the only determinants of choice behaviour. It will be assumed here, 
however, that a choice for a particular alternative does not 
automatically imply realization of that alternative. When there is 
excess demabe increased rationing takes place. The ratio of total 
demand of alternative n and the available supply determines the 
perunage V> of total demand that can be satisfied. 
It will be assumed until section 6 of this paper that rationing 
takes place in such a way that all actors choosing for type n of the 
good have a probability i> of realizing their choice. It may be 
objected that this is not a particularly realistic form of rationing. 
For Instance, in housing markets queueing seems to be of more 
importance. Furthermore the government usually gives a priority 
treatment to those actors that are especially in need of another 
dweiling and this characteristic of actual rationing schemes is 
excluded by the equal treatment of all households by giving them the 
same realization probability V • 
In answer to these objections it may be remarked that a realization 
probability ip implies an expected waiting time of 1/V> periods and 
that the two forms of rationing are, for this reason, not as different 
as they seem to be at first sight. Furthermore it is possible to make 
the realization probabilities i> different for different groups of 
actors as will be pointed out in section 6. For the moment we will 
therefore use the alocation scheme proposed above because it offers a 
convenient starting point for analysis. 
The probability •K , that an actor (household) of type m who is 
currently in state (a dweiling of type) n will choose to move to state 
n' will be assumed to be determined by all vectors x ,, and the choice 
J
 -n' 
probabilities ^ ,, : 
3 
» „, - * _„/ (x, x , -0 ) , (1) 
mn-+n mn-+n - i - IN 
m=l.,..., M , n, n' =0, . . . , N , 
where rp denotes the vector of realization probabilities i> 
(=[^n. • • -i>fj] ' ) with if> , replaced by 1 in order to deal with the fact 
that every actor has the possibility to continue his present state. 
These choice probability functions may be viewed as the outcome of 
utility maximization, where the utility that is attached to the choice 
for a particular alternative n may, e.g., be equal to the expected 
utility ^>.v , + (l-x6).v , where v , is the utility J
 n mn-m n mn-+n mn-m
 J 
attached to alternative n' by an actor of type m who is currently in 
2 
state n 
The characteristics that are associated with the various states will 
be assumed to be fixed, with one exception, viz. the prices p . The 
fixed arguments may be suppressed and we will therefore write instead 
of (1) : 
*™,-^' " ^ - « ' ( P . V> ) , (2) 
mn-m mn-m -
m=l,...,,M , n,n'=0,...,N . 
The choice probability functions will always be assumed to be 
continuous in the prices and realization probabilities for all 
nonnegative priees and realization probabilities. They are also 
assumed to be non-increasing in the own price, non-decreasing in the 
own realization probability, non-decreasing in the other prices and 
non-increasing in the other realization probabilities. 
3 Individual Choice Behaviour and Market Demand. 
* 
The total number of actors choosing for alternative n , D can be 
n 
determined as 
*
 M N 
D « S 2 b ,.* . (p , /* ) (3) 
n - , „ mn mn -m -
m=l n'=0 
n=0,l,.. . ,N 
where b , denotes the number of actors belonging to class m who are 
mn' 
currently in state n'. Since not all actors will be able to realize 
* 
their choice when é is smaller than 1 , we will refer to D as the 
n n 
revealed (as opposed to realized) demand for alternative n. 
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Realized demand, to be denoted as D , is equal to the sum of é 
n n n 
times the number of actors willing to move to state n from another 
state and the number of actors choosing to continue their sojourn in 
state n : 
M N 
D - 2 2 tf .b ,JT .(V , i? ) + 
n . , _ n mn mn -+n -
m=«l n'=0 
n'^n W 
+ b .7T (p , TJ) ) , 
mn mn-+n - ' t ' 
m-1, . . . ,M , n,n'=0,l N . 
A 
D is thus equal to the number of actors who are willing to move to 
state n (or stay there) and are able to do so. There are also actors 
who are originally in state n and who want to move to another state, 
but remain in state n since they are not able to realize that desire. 
These disappointed searchers will be referred to as D . Their number 
can be determined as being equal -to : 
M N 
D - 2 2 [l-i> ,].b .« ,(p , i>) , (5) 
n ., , _ n' mn mn-m' - ' t ' ' 
m=l n'=0 
nVn 
m-1 M , n-0,1,...,N . 
The effective demand for state n is the sum of realized demand for 
that state and the number of disappointed searchers who are in that 
state and will be denoted as D : 
n 
M N 
D - 2 2 j , b TT
 m . (p , tf>n ) + n - , _ n mn mn -m - - ,
 r. m=l n'=0 (6) 
+ [1-V» ,].b .n ,(p , ^ >n') , 
1
 n' mn mn-^n' - ' 
n=0 N . 
This effective demand D has to be equilibrated with the available 
n 
supply. It will be assumed throughout the paper that supply consists 
of fixed, positive amounts S . In the next section we will examine the 
existence of such an equilibrium when prices are completely fixed. 
It would be nice if the aggragated effective demands D had the same 
properties as the choice probability functions, i.e., if they would be 
non-increasing in the own price and the other realization 
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probabilities and non-decreasing in the other prices and the own 
realization probability. The following proposition can be proven : 
Proposition 3.1 The effective demands D , n=0,...,N , are 
non-increasing in the own price and non-decreasing in the own 
realization probability. 
Proof. We will rewrite (4) as follows : 
M 
D = Y b .ir (p , Z1) + 
n
 u
~ mn mn-+n - -
m=l 
M N 
+ ï ï 1> , -b , .TT , (p , Vn ) + (7) u
- ,
 n n' mn' mn'-»n - -m=l n'=0 
n'^n 
M N 
+ I ï [ W .] -b .JT ,(p , tfn) , u
. , „ n'J mn mn-*n'
 KV
- - ' 
m=l n'=0 
nVn 
n=0,...,N . 
Now consider the consequences of a small increase in p . The first and 
second expressions on the right-hand-side (rhs) of (7) will decrease 
or remain the same. The third expression will increase or remain the 
same. But this increase will never exceed the decrease in the first 
expression on the rhs of (7) since the choice probabilities 7r , , 
n'=0,...,N have to add up to 1 and the sum of the changes in these 
choice probabilities will always add up to zero. This shows that D 
will be non-increasing in the own price p . 
Now consider a small increase in the realization probability V • The 
first and the third expression on the rhs of (7) will not change, the 
second one will increase or remain the same. D is therefore 
n 
non-decreasing in the own realization probability ip . Q.E.D. 
D will not always be non-decreasing in the other prices p ,,. To 
see this consider the consequences of a small increase in p ,, , 
n'Vn. The change in the first two expressions on the rhs of (7) will 
be nonnegative. The sign of the change in the third expression is 
ambiguous. The choice probabilities % , will increase or remain the 
mn-*n 
same when n'/n", but ir ,, may decrease. However, there is one 
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important case in which the sign of the total change in D is still 
determined. 
Proposition 3.2 When ip is equal to 1, D , n=0,...,N , will be 
non-decreasing in the other prices p ,, , n'Vn. 
Proof. When é equals 1, the effect of the decrease in ir , , on D 
n n mn-+n' ' n 
will be nil. This means that we are left with only nonnegative changes 
and that the total effect on D will therefore be nonnegative. Q.E.D. 
The effects of a small increase in the realization probability 
ij} , , , n' V n , are also in general ambiguous in sign. The first and 
second expression on the rhs of (7) will decrease or remain the same. 
The change in the third expression is indeterminate because n 
°
 r
 mn-*n' ' 
will increase i.e., more people will be inclined to choose alternative 
n''. This increase will have a positive effect on the number of 
disappointed searchers who were intending to move to state n'', and 
may even compensate for the reverse effect on the number of 
disappointed searchers caused by the increase in ^ ,,. To see this we 
will write down the change in third expression on the rhs of (7) for 
M 
V b .{[1-tf ,,].ATT , , -è4 , , .% , , - Ai> , , .Air , , ) , Zj
, mn l
 Y
n' ' J mn-m' '
 Y
n' ' mn-m' '
 Y
n' ' mn-+n' ' 
m=l 
where Aw ,, is the change in n , , that occurs as a consequence 
mn-+n ,mn-+n n 
of the change &>/> , , in ip , , . There seems to be no general way to 
guarantee that this expression (possibly in combination with other 
parts of the rhs of (7)) is nonpositive. 
We have to conclude that the properties of the choice probability 
functions TT , with respect to changes in prices and realization 
mn->-n' r ° r 
probabilities do only partially carry over to the effective demand 
functions. 
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4 Rationed Equilibrium 
In the present section we will examine the question whether it is 
possible to determine the realization probabilities ij) in such a way 
that the effective demands will never exceed the available supply S 
and be equal to it whenever the corresponding realization probability 
is smaller than 1. Such a situation will be referred to as a rationed 
3 
equilibrium . Formally we define : 
Definition 4.1. A rationed equilibrium is a set of realization 
*& "$C "ïfc 
probabilities >^ , n=0,l N , 0 < i> < 1 such that D (p,^ ) < 
S for all n=l,...,N for which ^ > 0 , D ( p , ^ ) = S whenever 
n n n - - n 
* * * 
0 < ib < 1 and D (p ,ib ) > S whenever ib =0 , for given prices 
n n - - n n ° r 
po V 
The effective demand functions D (p,^ >) have been defined in (7) above. 
Supply will be assumed to consist of fixed, positive amounts. 
Before the existence of a rationed equilibrium will be proven we 
make some introductory remarks. A trivial equilibrium occurs when all 
realization probabilities are set equal to 0. Since it is assumed that 
all actors in the market can continue their present situation the 
supply S has to be equal to at least 2 b . It should be noted, rr J
 n m mn 
however, that this trivial equilibrium satisfies the definition of a 
fixed price equilibrium only when S = S b for all n=l,...,N. 
n m mn 
Since this trivial equilibrium is of little interest we would like 
to know wether there also exist other ones. One may conjecture that an 
affirmative answer can be given to this question on the basis of the 
following reasoning. Consider an arbitrary pair of states n and n'. It 
is possible that there are actors who want to move from n to n' and 
also that there are others willing to move in the reverse direction. 
The number of moves that can be realized is the minimum of both 
numbers. By considering combinations of more than two states an even 
higher number of moves can be realized. 
A problem that is inherent in this approach is that the number of 
actors willing to move to a certain state is itself determined partly 
by the values of the realization probabilities. For this reason the 
above reasoning does not seem to be of much help in demonstrating the 
existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, although it strongly suggests 
such. 
Another approach will therefore be adopted here. This approach makes 
use of Brouwer's fixed point theorem which states that a continuous 
mapping of a nonempty, closed and convex set into 'itself has a fixed 
point, i.e., a point that is mapped into itself (see e.g. Arrow and 
Hahn[1970] for a proof of the theorem). 
Proposition 4.1 For every set of nonnegative prices p_ p there 
exists a rationed equilibrium in the market where demand D is 
n 
given by (7) and supply consists of fixed, positive amounts S , 
n=0,...,N. 
Proof. We define Q as the set of vectors ip , 0 < ip < 1. The set Q is 
nonempty, closed and convex. Consider the following function F : 
F (V> ) = i> + max{0 , min[ -(D (p,V0-S )/-b) , l-i> ]} + 
n n n - n - - n n
 /ON 
- max{0 , min[ (Dn(p, V>)-Sn)/b) , ^  ]} , 
n=0,...,N . 
This function is continuous and maps the set Q into itself. We can 
* 
therefore be sure that there exists a fixed point i\> . It can be 
»* * 
inferred from (8) that ip equal 0 or 1 , or that D (p,^ > ) = S . When 
n n n - - n 
* * 
é equals 1 we can be sure that D (p,^ > ) < S . When é equals 0 we can 
n ^ n - - n rn n 
ie & be sure that D (p ,ib ) > S . We can therefore conclude that ib is a 
n - - n r 
rationed equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
* 
It may be remarked that the realization probability -ij> can only be 
r> * 
zero when S =) b and the realization probabilities TI> ave such that 
n TI jm -
no single actor who is currently in state n wants to move to another 
state and is able to do so. Although there is nothing in our 
assumptions that excludes this state of affairs, it seems to be a very 
special case only. 
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5 Mixed Equilibriuni 
Now that we have proven the existence of a fixed price equilibriuni, 
we turn to the question whether it will be possible to equilibrate the 
market by means of some mixed regime, in which prices are not 
completely fixed, but are restricted to vary within a limited range 
only. Such mixed regimes may be of higher relevance for the analysis 
of housing markets in Western European countries (where often the 
rented part of the market is highly regulated, while the 
owner-occupied part is relatively free) than thé fixed price regime 
analyzed in the preceding section. 
It will be assumed that for all alternatives 1,.. . . ,N there exists a 
minimum price p (possibly equal to 0) and a maximum price p 
(possibly equal to »). Allocation takes in first instance place only 
by means of prices. Only when a price has reached its upper bound and 
there is still excess demand, rationing may occur. These 
considerations give rise to the following definition of a mixed 
equilibrium. 
Definition 5.1. A mixed equilibrium is a set of prices 
(PT,...,p„} , such that p <p <p for all n-1,...,N , cl rN -n n rn 
and a set of realization probabilities [il>~ , . . . ,ip } , 
0 < i> < 1 for all n=0, .'. . ,N such that : 
n 
ie "k 
a) ib =1 for all n=0, . . . ,N with p < p < p , rn -n rn n 
b) D (p*,^*) < S when V> > 0 for all n=0, . . . ,N , 
n - - n n 
c) D (p ,é )=S for all alternatives n-0,...,N for which p > p , 
n - - n rn -n 
i> >o. 
n 
The existence of a mixed equilibrium will now be proven on the basis 
of the following two assumptions : 
Assumption 5.1 
lim * ,(p,^n) = 0 , (9) p -*» mn-+n' - r 
n 
m=l, . . . ,M , n,n'-0 N . 
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Assumption 5.2 When p - « , S > b . 
-
 rn n n 
The first assumption states that nobody is willing to move to state n 
when the price associated with such a'move increases without an upper 
bound. The second assumption states that there will be excess supply 
for all those states for which there does not exist a maximum price. 
These assumptions are rather weak. 
Proposition 5.1 When assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 are satisfied, there 
* * 
exists a mixed equilibrium (p ,ip ) in the market where demand D 
n 
is described by (6) and supply consists of fixed, positive amounts 
n 
n-0, ,N. 
Proof. We will prove this proposition with the aid of auxiliary 
variables r , n=0 N. The variables p and é 
n n n 
functions of these variables in the following way 
 will be defined as 
n 
i>. 
• • • { 
p when -ln(r ) < p 
-n n n 
•ln(r ) when p < -ln(r ) < p 
n -n n n 
p when -ln(r ) > p rn n -n 
when r < exp-p ) 
n rn 
r /exp(-p ) when r > exp(p ) 
n' r rn n n 
(10) 
n=0,...,N . 
(11) 
n-0,...,N 
These functions are continuous in r . Te set R of vectors r contains 
n 
all vectors for which exp(-p ) < r < 0. The set R is non-empty, 
closed and convex. We now define the vector-valued function F in the 
following way : 
Fn - rn + max{0 , min[ - (Dn(p(r) ,^(r)) -Sn)/b , r^rj } + 
- max{0 , min[ (Dn(p(r),^(r))-Sn)/b , rn] , 
n-0,...,N , 
(12) 
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where r is defined as exp(-p ). This function is continuous in the 
n r -n 
variables r and maps the set R into itself. We can thus be sure that 
n r 
* 
there exists a fixed point r . We show that this point can be 
identified with a mixed equilibrium (p (r ),V> (r )). First observe 
that the definitions of the functions p(r) and V>(r) imply that i> can 
be smaller than 1 only when p =p . The definition of the function F 
J
 n rn 
implies that at the fixed point we have r =r , D (p(r ) ,i>{v ))=S or 
n n n - - n 
r =0. When r =r , it follows from (12) that D (p(r ) ,i>(r )) < S . In 
n n n n - - - - n 
the same way it follows that D (p(r ) ,V"(r )) > S when r =0. Finally, 
we can exclude the possibility of some prices being » in equilibrium 
by our assumptions 5.1 and 5.2. Q.E.D. 
It should be observed that the (fixed-price) rationed equilibrium of 
section 4 is a special case of the mixed equilibrium, that occurs when 
the lower bound of the price p , p , equals the upper bound, 
p , for all n=0,...,N. 
n 
6 Class and origin-specifie realization probabilities 
In the present section we will investigate the question whether it 
is possible to vary the realization probabilities over the various 
demanders. In concrete situations there may be good reasons for 
introducing such variation. For instance, on the housing market it is 
customary to regard some demanders as being more in need of a certain 
type of dweiling than others and to give them a priority treatment. 
Also the government may want to favour some types of moves on this 
market, because the dwelllings that become vacant as a consequence of 
these moves are needed for other households. There are therefore good 
reasons to investigate the possibilities of making the realization 
probabilities dependent on the class to which the actor belongs and on 
his present state. For this purpose we introducé the notation ib 
r
 mn-m' 
for the probability that an actor of type m who is currently in state 
n will be able to move to state n' if he desires to do so. We will 
define these class and origin-specifie realization probabilities as 
non-increasing functions of general realization probabilities ij) , 
which may be regarded as 'average' realization probabilities, in the 
following general way : 
11 
^ „ ^ , = $„„_>„, (V> .) , (13) 
mn-»n mn-+n n 
m=l,...., M , n, n'=0, . . . , N , n' ^ n 
with : i> (1)=1 and j> (0)-0 , m=l,...,M , n.n'-O,...,N , n'*n. 
mn-»n mn-»-n 
For n'=n we will always have i> =1. We will require the sum 
J
 mn-m 
M N 
m-1 n=0 
ns*n' 
to be strictly decreasing in V . If one wishes to do so, this sum may 
even be required to be equal to M.(N+1).^ ,. In the latter case i> , is 
indeed the arithmetic average of the relevant specific averages. 
A set of class and origin-specific realization probabilities that 
fulfills these requirements will be called admissable. 
By reducing the realization probabilities for some classes of actors 
and for some current states earlier than others one may introducé a 
preferential treatment for some groups of demanders. In this way it 
can e.g., be guaranteed that demanders which are considered as being 
especially in need for a particular type of dweiling get a high 
realization probability even when the average realization probability 
is low. By making the realization probabilities origin-dependent the 
government may try to influence the distribution of the housing stock 
over the population. It may, for instance, stimulate moves of small 
households from large dwellings to smaller ones or moves of low-income 
households from expensive dwellings to cheaper ones. 
The existence of a rationed or mixed equilibrium with realization 
probabilities that vary over the different groups of demanders can be 
proven in exactly the same way as was done for the equilibria with 
realization probabilities that are only specific for the state of 
destination. Aggregate demand will be defined analogous to (7) as : 
M N 
D ( p , * W ) - I Y i> , (tf ).b ,.JT , (p.tf , W ) + 
(14) 
n - tJ, , tJrt mn'-*n n mn mn -m - -mn m=l n'=0 
M N 
. *% .
 A mn-m' n' mn mn'-m - -mn -m=l n'=*0 
n-0 N 
where f is a 'matrix' with three entries ; its elements are the class 
and origin-specific realization probabilities. 
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A rationed equilibrium with variable realization probabilities may 
now be defined as follows : 
Definition 6.1 A mixed equilibrium with class and origin-specific 
realization probabilities is a set of realization probabilities 
* 
{•6 . , 0 < -é <1 , m=l M , n,n'=0, . . . ,N) and a set of prices 
mn->n' n r 
{p , p <p <p , n=0 N } such that : 
rn -n rn rn 
~k & 
a) ib =1 for all m and n whenever p <p ,<p , , n=0, . . . ,N , 
mn-m' cn' rn' rn' 
b) D <S whenever é . > 0 for at least one m and n' , 
n n mn'-m 
* 
c) D =S whenever il> , < 1 for at least one m and n' or 
n n mn'-m 
P >P • rn -TL 
We will prove a proposition which is closely analogous to proposition 
5.1 and restate assumption 5.1 for this purpose as : 
Assumption 5.1' 
lim x
 f(p,tf ) - 0 , (15) p -«o mn-m' - -mn 
n 
m=l,...,M , n,n'-0 N . 
Proposition 6.1 When assumptions 5.1' and 5.2 are satisfied there 
exisits a mixed equilibrium for every set of admissable class and 
origin-specific realization probability functions. 
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of proposition 5.1. 
The vector-valued function F that maps the set R into itself will now 
be defined as : 
F •- r + max{0 , min[-(D (p(r) ,tt(V>(r))) -S )/b , r -r ] } + (16) 
n n n - - vrx-/// n ' n n 
- max{0 , min[(Dn(p(r),*(V>(r)))-Sn)/b , r j } 
This continuous function maps the set R into itself and has a fixed 
point r . This fixed point corresponds with a mixed equilibrium 
* * * * •* 
(p (r ) ,% (i/i (r )). To see this, first observe that ip can be smaller 
than 1 only when p =p , and that this implies that only when this 
condition is fulfilled the realization probabilities xj) . 
mn-m 
corresponding with that particular n can be smaller than 1. 
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Furthermore the definition of F implies D can only exceed S when r 
n n
 J
 n n 
equals 0, which implies that i/> , =0 for all m and n'. Finally, it 
follows also from the definition of F that at the fixed point demand 
n r 
* 
D will be exactly equal to supply S when r <r < r , i.e. whenever n v-i r r y n -n n n p > p or V , >0 for at least one m and n' (nVn) . Q.E.D. rn -n mn'-*n 
The mixed equilibrium which was proven to exist in proposition 5.1 is 
a special case of the equilibrium of proposition 6.1 that occurs when 
mn -*n n n 
8 Discussion 
Proposition 6.1 is the most general result that will be proven in 
this paper. It incorporates propositions 5.1 and 4.1 as special cases. 
The contents of the proposition can be translated in non-technical 
terms as follows. When prices are not perfectly flexible, but are only 
able to vary within a limited range, rationing may be necessary in 
order to attune demand to the available supply. By choosing a 
particular set of origin and class specific realization probabilities 
the government may influence this equilibrium in such a way that some 
groups of demanders get a preferential treatment. 
One may wonder whether the mixed equilibrium will be unique, i.e., 
whether there exists only one such equilibrium for a given set of 
upper and lower bounds of the prices and a given set of class and 
origin specific realization probability functions. An unambiguous 
answer to this question cannot be given, however, since we are not 
aware of a set of sufficiënt conditions for the uniqueness of 
equilibrium in the type of model under consideration which is 
satisfied by the model under consideration. In economics one usually 
applies the Gale-Nikaido[1966] theorem on global univalence of 
vector-valued functions. This requires differentiability of the 
aggregate demand functions and semi-definiteness of the matrix of 
4 
partial derivatives of this function. It is easy to show that the 
latter condition is fulfilled when the aggregate demand function is 
increasing in the own price, non-decreasing in the other prices, 
increasing in the own realization probability and non-decreasing iin 
the other realization probabilities. It has been shown in section 2, 
however, that the last property will not automatically be possessed by 
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the aggregate demand function. Furthermore, it would be difficult to 
find a satisfsactory sufficiënt condition for this characteristic . We 
must therefore conclude that uniqueness of the rationed equilibrium 
i - v 6 can in general not be proven . 
Throughout this paper the discussion has been cast in static terms, 
but it should be noticed that the choice probabilities that have been 
used are in fact transition probabilities. All actors are initially in 
a certain state and have to decide whether or not they want to move to 
another one. The model may therefore be considered as describing the 
short-run equilibrium of a dynamic process. 
This implies that there may exist some dynamic phenomena in our 
model which should be taken into account. The most important of these 
dynamic phenomena is queueing. To see the potential effects of 
queueing, assume that a particular choice alternative, say n, is 
rationed. This means that some actors who have been searching for a 
dweiling of type n, have not been able to find such a dweiling. In the 
next period these actors have to make a new choice. One may expect 
that these people are more likely to search again for alternative n 
than other actors, who just start searching. If this is indeed the the 
case it means that the choice probabilities are co-determined by the 
choice that was made in the former period. 
In general, this effect can-be taken into account by distinguishing 
the actors not only on the basis of the class to which they belong and 
their present housing situation, but also on the basis of the choices 
they made in the (recent) past. Only when the choice probabilities are 
the same for groups that made different decisions in the past but are 
otherwise identical can these dynamic effects be left out of 
consideration. 
In order to specify the complete dynamic model one needs to say 
something about the transition of demanders from one class to another 
and about the entry and exit of demanders. The specification of such a 
complete dynamic model lies, however, beyond the scope of the present 
paper. 
Although there has been a great deal of interest in fixed price 
equilibria in general equilibrium economics (see e.g. Dreze[1974] and 
Benassy[1975]), there has been no comparable interest in the study of 
such equilibria for specifie markets. In particular for the housing 
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market we are aware of only two exceptions, viz. Wiesmeth[1985], which 
uses a framework that is significantly different from the one adopted 
here, and Anas and Cho[1988]. In the latter paper a model is 
constructed that is somewhat similar to the one presented here. It is 
pointed out that the sufficiënt conditions for uniqueness of 
equilibrium stated in Anas and Cho[1986] may fail to hold (p.221) and 
also that there may not exist a short run equilibrium in the model 
(p.220-221). The latter conclusion seems to differ from the one 
reached above (proposition 6.1) which implies that, under reasonable 
conditions, there will always exist a short-run equilibrium in the 
model . 
The model, that has been developed in the foregoing can in priciple 
be used to examine the consequenes of changes in the allocation 
mechanism on the housing market. In Rouwendal[1988c] a discrete choice 
model has been estimated in which the consequences of disequilibrium 
and queueing for the observed choice frequencies are 
incorporated.probabilities for different groups of demanders are not 
taken into account, however, so that the model corresponds with the 
situation dealt with in section 5. Extension to the situation of s6, 
in which the realization probabilities are origin and class specific 
•is conceptually straightforward, but may be dificult to implement 
empirically. In all probability one needs information about the 
allocation rules used by the various institutions on the housing 
market under consideration. Using this approach it may be possible to 
gain understanding in the functioning of regulated housing markets and 
on the effects of (changes in) government measures taken with respect 
to such markets on various groups of households. 
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Notes 
1 In some cases alternative assumptions may be desirable. E.g. when 
one has to deal with forced movements it may be useful to direct 
the actors that have not been successful to a different type of 
dweiling than the one they currently occupy. 
2 The derivation of such a model is not an easy task, however. See 
Rouwendal[1988b] for a discussion of the problem and the 
formulation of an operational model for discrete choice behaviour 
in situations of uncertainty. 
3 In the literature the term fixed-price equilibrium is also used. 
The term equilibrium is of course somewhat misleading. 
4 One should formulate the aggregate demands as functions of the 
auxiliary variables r. A sufficiënt condition for uniqueness of the 
* 
fixed point r is that the Jacobean matrix of the system of demand 
equations has a dominant diagonal. This will be the case when the 
demand functions possess the properties mentioned in the text. 
5 One may require dn ,/dq . to be smaller than n . in order to 
J
 mn-+n n mn-»-n 
guarantee that the aggragate demand functions are non-increasing in 
the other realization probabilities. However, this coauses new 
problems since n . will be zero for q =0 and then the condition 
r
 mn-m' nn' 
mentioned above would imply that n , is always zero, unless one 
allows for a discontinuity in the choice probability function. 
Discontinuities would imply a violation of the conditions for the 
fixed-point theorem. 
6 This does of course not automatically imply that simultaneous 
equilibria will be likely to occur. From the discussion in section 
3 it will be clear that the possibility that aggregate demand will 
be decreasing, although not easy to rule out, is not very likely to 
occur. 
7 Essentiaslly equal to the Gale-Nikaido[1966] theorem. 
8 It is not completrely clear what causes the difference in the 
conclusions, but the fact that Anas and Cho always require equality 
of supply and demand will probably have somthing to do with it. 
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